National Statistical Agencies routinely release large amounts of tabular information. Prior to dissemination, tabular data needs to be processed to avoid the disclosure of individual confidential information. One widely used class of methods is based on the modification of the table cells values. However, previous approaches were not able to preserve the values of the marginal cells and the additivity relations for a general table of any dimension, size and structure. Moreover, effective methods could only be designed for low-dimensional tables. To fill this void, a unified framework for a new class of controlled perturbation methods is presented. Given a set of tables to be protected, they find alternative ones that, guaranteeing confidentiality, minimize the information loss. This goal is accomplished by computing the minimum-distance values to the original cells that make the released information safe. That means solving a constrained optimization problem, whose variables and constraints are respectively related to the tables cells and additivity relations. In practice, real tables may have millions of cells and thousands of linear relations. Three particular methods from the generic framework are derived and implemented, using the one, two and infinity distances. These three variants are evaluated with the unique standard library for tabular data protection currently available. That library contains both low-dimensional artificially generated problems, and real-world highly-structured ones. Some of the complex instances were contributed by National Statistical Agencies, and, therefore, are good representatives of theirs real needs. Unlike alternative methods, the minimum-distance approach was able to solve all the instances with limited computational resources. Each instance only required few seconds on a standard personal computer. The quality of the solution obtained is studied in detail for seven of the most complex instances. The results show that the minimum-distance framework is an effective and promising approach for the protection of large volumes of tabular data.
Introduction
The safe dissemination of data is one of the main concerns of National Statistical Agencies. The released data can be classified as disaggregated or aggregated. Disaggregated data (a.k.a. micro- data or microfiles) consists of files of records, each record providing the values for a set of variables of an individual. Aggregated data (a.k.a. tabular data) is obtained from microdata crossing two or more variables, which results in sets of tables with a likely large number of cells. It must be guaranteed, for both types of data, that no individual information can be derived from the released information. The available methods for this purpose belong to the field of statistical disclosure control. Good introductions to the state-of-the-art in this field can be found in the monographs Willenboorg and de Waal (2000) and Domingo-Ferrer (2002) .
In this paper we focus on tabular data protection. Although each cell of the table shows aggregated information for several individuals, there is a risk of disclosing individual data. This is clearly shown in the example of If there was only one individual in zip code z 2 and age interval 51-55, then any external attacker would know the salary of this single person is 40000$. For two individuals, any of them could deduce the salary of the other, becoming an internal attacker. Usually, cells showing information about few individuals are considered sensitive, although other rules can be used in practice. Methods for detecting sensitive cells are out of the scope of this work. A recent discussion about sensitivity rules can be found in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2002) , and Robertson and Ethier (2002) . Figure 1 showed a two-dimensional example. This can be considered the simplest case. However, in practice we must deal with more complex situations, including multidimensional, hierarchical and linked tables. Multidimensional tables are obtained crossing more than two variables, and they can be individually protected. Hierarchical tables are sets of tables whose variables have a hierarchical relation (e.g., zip code and city). In that case, the total or marginal cells of some tables are internal ones for the others. They have to be protected together, to avoid the disclosure of sensitive data. Finally, linked tables are a generalization of the previous situation, where several tables are made from the same microdata, thus sharing information or cells, either hierarchical or not. Again, they have to be protected together. Linked tables can deal with any table dimension, size and structure, and thus include the other situations. Dealing with linked tables is a desired feature of any tabular protection method. Eventually, the final goal would be the protection of the whole set of linked tables that can be produced from some microfiles (e.g., a population census). Clearly, the number of cells involved in that case might be of several millions, an impractical size for most current tabular protection techniques. The new family of protection methods introduced in this work deal with linked tables, and, as shown in the computational results, can solve realworld large instances in few seconds. All the above situations can both refer to frequency tables (i.e., cell values are integer and are usually associated to the number of individuals in that cell) or magnitude tables (i.e., cell values are real, and, for instance, they show the mean for some other variable of all the individuals in that cell). In this work we focus on tables of magnitudes. For tables of frequencies the procedures here described can also be applied followed by some heuristic post-process.
Current methods for tabular data protection can be classified as perturbative (they change the cell values) or nonperturbative (no change is performed). The most widely used nonperturbative method is cell suppression, where some secondary cells are removed to avoid the disclosure of some sensitive primary cells (which are removed as well). That results in a difficult combinatorial optimization problem, which finds the pattern of secondary suppressions that makes the table safe with a minimum number of cells or information loss. Some heuristics for two and three-dimensional tables (Kelly, Golden and Assad 1992; Carvalho, Dellaert and Osório 1994; Cox 1995; Dellaert and Luijten 1999; Castro 2002 ) and exact methods for linked tables (Fischetti and Salazar 2000) have been suggested for the cell suppression problem. The main inconvenient of this approach is that, due to its combinatorial nature, the solution of very large instances (with possible millions of cells) can result in impractical execution times.
Among the perturbative approaches, one of the techniques that received more attention was rounding. This method rounds cell values to a multiple of a fixed integer rounding base. Controlled rounding is a variant where the additivity of the table is preserved (i.e., rounded marginal values are the sum of the corresponding slice of internal rounded cells). Initially introduced in Bacharach (1996) , efficient methods could only be developed for two-dimensional tables (Cox and Ernst 1982; Cox 1987) , possibly with subtotals (Cox and George 1989) . For three-dimensional tables controlled rounding is a NP-hard problem . Several heuristics and exact approaches (Kelly, Golden, Assad and Baker 1990) were devised, but were only applied to small size tables. The NP-hardness of the approach makes it impractical for large tables, as the real-world ones tested in this work. Moreover, in practice it can be necessary to maintain some (possibly all) of the original total cells, instead of rounding them.
To avoid the above lacks of rounding, we suggest a new family of controlled perturbation methods that find the minimum-distance (or closest) tables to those to be protected, preserving marginal values, if required, as well as any set of additional linear constraints. Finding the minimum-distance tables means we try to minimize the information loss when delivering the perturbed values. This approach needs to solve a constrained continuous optimization problem, whose variables and constraints are related to the tables cells and additivity relations, respectively. The formulation of the optimization problem depends on the particular distance used. In this work we examine three of them: L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ . We'll show that real-world large instances can be efficiently solved using current linear and quadratic programming technology. Independently, Dandekar and Cox (2002) suggested the controlled tabular adjustment method. It will be seen that controlled tabular adjustment is equivalent to the minimum-distance approach using the L 1 distance. Recently, Dandekar (2003) introduced an alternative perturbation approach, computationally more efficient that the family of methods here presented. However, such approach can not preserve the value of total cells, which is a desirable property in practice (rather, total cells suffer the largest perturbations). The minimum-distance framework combines both features: is efficient and can preserve total cells.
The structure of the document is as follows. Section 2 introduces the minimum-distance controlled perturbation framework. Sections 3, 4 and 5 detail the variants associated to the L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ distances, respectively. Section 6 compares the optimization problems derived from those three particular distances. Section 7 analyzes the disclosure risk of the method, showing it is safe. Finally, Section 8 presents some computational results in the solution of some real-world large instances. These computational results are used both to verify the effectiveness of the approach, and to compare the above three distances.
2 The minimum-distance controlled perturbation framework Any table or list of tables, of any dimension, size and structure, can be represented as an array of cells a i , i = 1, . . . , n, that satisfy a set of m linear relations
a ∈ IR n being the vector of a i 's, b ∈ IR m the right-hand-side term of the linear relations, and M ∈ IR m×n the cell relations matrix. For instance, for a two-dimensional table of r + 1 rows and c + 1 columns (last row and column are marginal) we have
In the above example, n = rc, m = r + c, and vector b of (1) would correspond to marginal cell values, implicitly meaning they are fixed. Moving marginal cells to the left-hand-side in (2), we get n = (r + 1)(c + 1) and b = 0, marginal cells thus having the same status-not fixed-that internal cells.
In practice most tables have positive cell values, and constraints
must be added to (1). Given a set P of indices of sensitive or confidential cells, the minimum-distance controlled perturbation method finds, according to some metric, the closest values x i to a i , i = 1, . . . , n, that satisfy the table relations (1) and, if needed, (3), such that x i , i ∈ P-the values of the sensitive cells-are safe (safety is discussed below). This model can be applied to any kind of table or set of tables, since it does not constraint the structure of the cell relations Ma = b. Any other set of linear relations can also be included to this model. For instance, if needed, we can impose that the values x i of some cells must be close enough to the original values a i , i.e., (1−α)a i ≤ x i ≤ (1+β)a i , for some small α and β. For cells corresponding to national or regional totals, or for cells with a zero value, α = β = 0 can be a good choice (i.e., we don't perturb the original cell value). This is usual practice in those situations.
This general model can be formulated as
x ∈ IR n being the vector of perturbed cell values. L in (4) denotes the distance to be used, which can be affected by any positive semidefinite diagonal metric matrix W = diag(w 1 , . . . , w n ). In the computational results of Section 8 we used w i = 1/a i . The three more reasonable choices for L are L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ . They are discussed in the following sections. (5) guarantees x is a well-formed table. The bounds (6) are used to deal with the level of knowledge any attacker has about the cell values, and to guarantee the safety of the perturbed table, as follows:
• We assume any attacker knows a lower and upper bound, respectively a i and a i , for each cell a i , i = 1, . . . , n. If no previous knowledge is assumed for cell i, we simply set a i = 0 (a i = −∞ if bounds (3) were omitted) and a i = +∞. (6) includes bounds a i ≤ x i ≤ a i .
• The protection of each sensitive cell i ∈ P is achieved through a lower and upper protection levels, respectively lpl i and upl i , such that the released value should be greater or equal than a i + upl i or less or equal than a i − lpl i . These protection levels are provided by the user (e.g., the National Statistical Agency), and they are usually a fraction of the cell value a i . We assume that the user fixes in advance the sense of the protection for each sensitive cell. Therefore, (6) includes one of the bounds
If the values of a large number of cells want to be preserved, problem (4-6) can be infeasible. This can happen, e.g., for small instances if marginal cells are maintained in the perturbed table. For large tables, infeasibility will rarely occur. However, if needed, it is possible to modify (4-6) to an alternative formulation as follows. For all cells i that are fixed to the original a i value, remove bounds a i ≤ x i ≤ a i in (6), and add the penalization P ||x i − a i || L to the objective function (4), P being a large penalty parameter. Due to the large value of P , x i will be equal to a i whenever possible. The penalization will intervene in the objective function only if no feasible solution with xi = a i exists.
If, instead of being a user decision, we want the mathematical programming problem (4-6) to choose the best sense for sensitive cells, either x i ≥ a i + upl i or x i ≤ a i − lpl i , we need a binary variable and two extra constraints for each of them:
S in (7) is a large value (e.g.,
That results in a difficult combinatorial optimization problem, which would constraint the effectiveness of the approach to small and medium sized problems. Therefore, instead of solving the combinatorial optimization problem, we can heuristically decide in advance the sense for each sensitive cell (y i = 1 or y i = 0) and then solving the optimization problem (4-6). Some straightforward heuristics were suggested in Dandekar and Cox (2002) , but, from the reported computational results, none of them produced significantly better results. The particular choice of y i values do not affect the safety of the released perturbed table, but only the deviations from the original cell values.
The general problem (4-6) can also be formulated in terms of deviations or perturbations from the current cell values. Indeed, defining
the optimization problem (4-6) can be transformed to
where z ∈ IR n is the vector of deviations, and
Two benefits of the formulation in terms of deviations are:
• The cell values a i of the real table are not needed to solve the optimization problem (9-11).
Only the cell relations and deviations bounds, represented by matrix M and vectors l z and u z , are required. Therefore, the solution of the above optimization problem can be performed by an external entity (e.g., if some nonavailable software or hardware was required) without delivering the original cell values.
• Two tables with the same cell relations and bounds, that only differ in the cell values (e.g., corresponding to data of two different years or census), are protected with the same perturbations. Therefore, the optimization problem (9-11) only needs to be solved once.
Next three sections specialize the general model for the L 1 , L 2 , and L ∞ distances, using the formulation in terms of deviations.
3 The L 1 objective Using the L 1 distance, the problem (9-11) becomes
To transform the above into an equivalent linear programming problem, we replace each z i by the difference of two nonnegative variables, z + i and z − i , associated respectively with the positive and negative deviations:
The resulting linear programming problem is
subject to (12), will respectively be negative and positive. Then, for nonsensitive cells, equations (17-18) reduce to 0 ≤ z
For a sensitive cell i, the equations to be used depend on the sense of the protection considered, defined in (7) by the binary variable y i . If the sense is "upper" (i.e., y i = 1) then we must impose
If the sense is "lower" (i.e., y i = 0) then we need
The final linear programming problem to be solved is (16), (19), (20), (21). (22) Using w i = 1/a i , as in the computational results of Section 8, the objective function to be minimized is the total relative deviation between the original and the perturbed data. (22) is basically the same model of Dandekar and Cox (2002) . The only difference is that the formulation in Dandekar and Cox (2002) , instead of fixing z (20) and (21), respectively, made them only nonnegative. That can provide wrong results and unsafe tables. For instance, it could happen that, for a cell i with sense "upper protection" (i.e., y i = 1), we had z
That would not violate the constraints imposed in Dandekar and Cox (2002) , but the resulting perturbation for that cell, according to (14) 
The L 2 objective
Using the L 2 distance, the problem (9-11) becomes
We can remove the square root of the objective, since it does not change the solution point, and makes the optimization problem simpler. The rest of constraints and bounds need not to be modified. In particular, and unlike the L 1 formulation of previous section, negative deviations are not a source of trouble, since they always appear squared in the objective function. The final quadratic optimization problem to be solved is
subject to (10), (11). (23) Using w i = 1/a i , as in the computational results of Section 8, the objective function corresponds to the χ 2 distance between the original and the perturbed data (L.H. Cox, personal communication, March 26, 2003) .
The L ∞ objective
In this case, the problem (9-11) is
To remove absolute values, we proceed as in Section 3, replacing each variable by the difference of two positive variables. Moreover, it seems reasonable to consider separately the deviations for the sensitive and nonsensitive cells, since the former are forced to be greater than zero whereas the latter should be as close as possible to zero. The problem to be solved is thus (19), (20), (21).
To transform the above into a linear programming problem we add two extra variables, z ∈P and z ∈P , which will store the maximum deviation for, respectively, the sensitive and nonsensitive cells. The equivalent linear programming problem can be written as
Since (24) is a minimization problem, last two sets of equations force z ∈P and z ∈P to be exactly the maximum (weighted) deviations for each group of cells. The distances of Sections 3-5 gave rise to three different optimization problems, whose main features are shown in Table 1 . Only the most efficient solution algorithms for the type of problem are reported. The L 2 objective provides the smallest problem, but it can only be efficiently solved by an interior-point algorithm (Wright 1997) . For the other two problems we can either use an interior-point algorithm or the simplex method (Dantzig 1963) . The efficiency of those methods depends on the particular structure of the problem (Bixby 2002) , and, as it will shown in Section 8, it is difficult to know in advance which will be the fastest option for a particular instance. A theoretical advantage of interior-point algorithms is that they have a polynomial complexity, both for linear and quadratic optimization problems. On the other hand, although the simplex method is nonpolynomial, in practice it is known to be very efficient. It is worth to note that the computational cost for the quadratic problem (23), solved through an interior-point algorithm, is the same as if it was linear, because it has a separable objective function (i.e., there are no products of two different variables) (Wright 1997) . Moreover, in the tabular data protection context, interiorpoint algorithms can be specialized to efficiently solve large instances (Castro 2003) .
Analysis of the disclosure risk of the method
To retrieve the original cell values a i from the released ones x i , an attacker needs the applied deviations z i . Those deviations are the solution of the optimization problem (9-11). Detailing the expression for the bounds (11), the attacker should then solve
The information required for the solution of (25-29) is:
• The particular distance L used in (25) to compute the deviations. Without this information the attacker should try to solve the problems for L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ , considering that one of the three solutions gives the required deviations.
• The weights w i , i = 1, . . . , n used in (25). If w i = 1/a i , the weights are clearly unknown to the attacker.
• The constraints matrix M of (26). The attacker knows it from the cell relations of the released table.
• The lower and upper bounds a i −a i and a i −a i , i = 1, . . . , n, of (27) and (28) (27) and (28) can be removed. That would be the case if large bounds a i and a i are used by default when protecting tables (e.g., a i = 0 and a i = +∞).
• The set P of sensitive cells of (29). Unlike other protection methods-as cell suppression-, the released table gives no information about which cells are sensitive, or candidates to be sensitive. Therefore, the attacker is forced to deduce sensitive cells from his/her own knowledge.
• The lower and upper protection levels lpl i and upl i , i ∈ P, and the sense ("upper" or "lower") used in (29) for each sensitive cell when protecting the original table. In practice, that information will not be distributed with the released table. Protection levels are usually a percentage of the cell values a i , which are unknown to the attacker. The number of variations for the protection senses is 2 |P| . If the senses were, for instance, randomly chosen, the attacker would be unable to reproduce them.
Except for the constraints matrix M, the rest of required terms are unknown or uncertain to the attacker. Therefore, problem (25-29) can not be solved, and the released table will be safe. However, we will analyze two unfavorable situations, where the attacker has respectively partial and complete information about the problem. Although fairly improbable in practice, they are considered to stress the low disclosure risk of the method.
Attacker with partial information
First, consider the attacker knows L, w i , that bounds (27) and (28) are inactive-thus can be removed-, the set P of sensitive cells, and the sense ("upper" or "lower") of each sensitive cell. Without loss of generality, and to simplify the exposition, assume all the senses are "upper". With that information, the safety of the deviations relies on the protection levels upl i of the sensitive cells. If the attacker can obtain approximate values upl i = upl i + e i , e i ∈ IR, i ∈ P, the problem to be solved to disclose the deviations is
If e i = 0 for all i ∈ P, the solution of (30) can provide the deviations used to protect the 
Proof. This is an immediate result of the sensitivity theorem of optimization, which states that, given a problem min x f (x) subject to g(x) ≥ d, and a point (x
See, e.g., Luenberger (1989, pp. 312-318) .
Although not made explicit, the above proposition applies to (30) once formulated as one of the optimization problems (22), (23) or (24). In (22) and (24) the variables were z + and z − . In that case, since we are assuming an upper sense for all the sensitive cells, only the Lagrange multipliers of the bounds z + i ≥ upl i should be considered. Moreover, for, respectively, the L 1 and L ∞ distances, problems (22) and (24) were linear, and the relation (31) can be recast as
z * being the deviations used to protect the table. Equation (32) holds for small enough vectors e = (e 1 , . . . , e |P| ), which are problem dependent. For instance, if (30) is solved through the simplex algorithm, (32) is guaranteed for those vectors e = (e 1 , . . . , e |P| ) such that z * (e) and z * have the same partition of basic and nonbasic variables (see, e.g., Luenberger (1989, pp. 95-96 ) for a comprehensive explanation).
If the attacker does not know the set P of sensitive cells, and uses and approximate one P , the multipliers of cells i ∈ P \ P will also intervene in (31), decreasing even more the disclosure risk. Proposition 1 gives an indicator of the quality of the protection: tables with non-small Lagrange multipliers for the bounds of deviations are unlikely to be disclosed, even if the attacker has a good knowledge about the original data.
To illustrate the above discussion, consider the example of Figure 2 . Table (a) shows the original data to be protected. Sensitive cells appear in boldface, and their upper protection levels upl i are given in brackets. Using the L 1 distance, weights w i = 1, and bounds a i = 0 and a i = ∞ for all the internal cells, the optimal deviations computed are shown in Table ( (27) and (28) are inactive in the solution, the attacker can use (30) to disclose the deviations of Table (b) . If, for instance, the attacker can adjust all the original upl i protection levels, but for cell a 11 , (in this case, if e 11 ≤ 4, e 23 = e 33 = e 34 = 0), from (32) and since µ 11 = 0, a solution with the same objective function (and possibly with the same deviations) that for deviations z obtained are those of 
Attacker with complete information
The attacker may not be able to reproduce the right perturbations through (25-29) even with complete information:
Proposition 2 Assume the attacker knows all the terms of problem (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) . If the L 2 distance is used, the solution of that problem will provide the deviations used to protect the table. However, for L 1 or L 2 , the attacker can obtain alternative deviations.
Proof. The objective function of (23), for the L 2 distance, is strictly convex, and thus has a unique minimizer on the feasible region. Therefore, independently of the solution algorithm or implementation used, the attacker will obtain the deviations used to protect the table. For L 1 and L ∞ , the objective functions of (22) and (24) Table ( c) of Figure  3 shows, for the same data, the unique solution for the L 2 distance. Since L 2 involves a quadratic function, the solution attempts to distribute the deviations among all the cells, obtaining a noninteger solution (valid for magnitude tables). The behaviour of the three distances is studied in detail in the next section. 
Computational evaluation
We implemented the three models described in Sections 3-5 using the AMPL modelling language (Fourer, Gay and Kernighan 1993) and CPLEX 8.0 (ILOG CPLEX 2002). We applied them to the CSPLIB test suite, the unique currently available set of instances for tabular data protection (Fischetti and Salazar 2000) . CSPLIB can be freely obtained from http://webpages.ull.es/-users/casc/#CSPlib:. Although these instances were originally produced for the cell suppression problem, the information provided is the same that for the minimum-distance approach. CSPLIB contains both low-dimensional artificially generated problems, and real-world highly-structured ones. Some of the complex instances were contributed by National Statistical Agencies-as, e.g., Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Netherlands), Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy (U.S.), Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom) and Statistisches Bumdesant (Germany)-, and therefore are good representatives of theirs real needs. In all the executions a value of at least a i + upl i for all i ∈ P was imposed (i.e., sense "upper protection" was considered for the sensitive cells), and cell values were weighted by w i = 1/a i in the objective function. All runs were carried on a notebook with a Pentium Mobile 4 at 1.8 GHz and 512 Mb of RAM.
We did two groups of computational experiments, which are shown in next two Subsections. In the first group we performed a detailed comparison of the three distances using a small subset of instances. In the second group we solved the remaining CSPLIB instances, again with the three distances.
Comparing the three distances
For the computational comparison we used the seven most complex instances of CSPLIB, which were also the choice in Dandekar (2003) . Those instances are challenging for other approaches, as cell suppression, whereas, as shown below, they can be solved in few seconds with the minimumdistance approach. Table 2 provides their main features: identifier (column "Name"), number of dimensions and structure-linked or hierarchical-(column "Dimensions"), size for each dimension (column "Size"), number of total cells and sensitive cells (columns "n" and "|P|", respectively), and number of constraints (column "m"). The structure and size information was obtained from Dandekar (2003) . Tables 3-9 show the results obtained for each instance with the three objective functions. For the L 2 objective function we used the primal-dual interior-point algorithm, which can be considered the most efficient choice. The L 1 and L ∞ objective functions were solved with the two best linear programming algorithms: the simplex method and the primal-dual interior-point method. Although the optimal objective function provided by both algorithms is the same, the solution point returned can be different. For L 1 , both the simplex and interior-point solutions were very similar, since all the cells intervene in the objective function. For L ∞ , which only considers the sensitive and nonsensitive cells with the maximum deviation, the values obtained for the other cells with the simplex method were much better. In Tables 3-9 we report the results obtained with the simplex solutions for L 1 and L ∞ .
For each of the three objective functions, Tables 3-9 show the following information. Row "CPU" gives the CPU time in seconds for each algorithm, simplex or interior-point. Rows "Abs. dev." provide the mean (columns "mean"), standard deviation (columns "std") and maximum (columns "max.") of the absolute deviations (i.e., |z i |) of the cell values, for all the cells (row "all"), for the sensitive cells (row "∈ P"), and for the nonsensitive cells (row " ∈ P"). A similar information is provided for the percentage absolute deviations (i.e., 100|z i |/a i ) in rows "Perc. dev.". Rows "Distr. abs. dev." and "Distr. perc. dev." show, respectively, the distribution of the absolute and percentage deviations, i.e., the number of sensitive and nonsensitive cells (columns "∈ P" and " ∈ P") within each of the intervals considered. For the absolute deviations, the same scale is used for the three distances. Finally, rows "2-norm" report the two-norm of the deviations (i.e., ||z|| 2 ), again for sensitive, nonsensitive, and all the cells.
Looking at Tables 3-9 we can draw some conclusions about the behaviour of each of the three objectives. As for performance, we see that most of the optimization problems could be solved until optimality in few seconds on a standard personal computer. For L 1 and L ∞ the best solution algorithm depends on the particular instance, and it is difficult to know in advance which will be the best choice. It is also clear that L ∞ provides the slowest executions, due to the number of extra constraints considered in (24). The L 2 objective, solved through a quadratic interior-point solver, was always the most efficient choice (except for the smallest instance hier13, where it was only 0.6 seconds slower than the L 1 and simplex combination). In most instances the solution time of the L 2 objective was about half the time of the second fastest option. This is because, first, the complexity of solving a quadratic separable optimization problem (i.e., with a diagonal weight matrix W) is the same that for a linear one, if we use an interior-point algorithm; and second, problem (22) involves the double of variables that (23). It is also worth to note that the solution times obtained with the interior-point algorithm, for the three objectives, can even be improved using specialized solvers that exploit the tables structure. Some work has already been done along these lines for very large three-dimensional tables (Castro 2003) using specialized interior-point algorithms (Castro 2000) .
The L 2 objective provides also the lowest means and, mainly, the lowest standard deviations for the absolute deviations. Such lowest standard deviations are not surprising, since the L 2 objective, due to its quadratic nature, attempts to evenly distribute the required deviations among all the cells. As for the other two objectives, L ∞ provided better absolute deviations than L 1 , but for instances hier13 and hier16. That was, a priori, an unexpected result, since only two cells appear in the objective function of (24), whereas all the perturbations are considered in (22). The distribution of the absolute deviations shows that L 1 provides the greater number of cells in the lowest interval. However, L 2 reports less cells with medium-large deviations than the other two distances. This is because such large deviations are highly (i.e., quadratically) penalized in the L 2 objective function.
As for the percentage deviations, L 1 must clearly provide the best mean values, since its objective function is exactly the sum of percentage absolute deviations (as said before, we used weights w i = 1/a i ). However, the L 2 objective provides similar mean percentage deviations, and, for most instances, with slightly better standard deviations. L ∞ provided worser means and standard deviations, but, as a consequence of its objective function, the lowest maximum values. The best mean values of the L 1 objective are observed in the distribution of the percentage deviations: most values happen to be in the lowest intervals. Although that is also true for the other two objectives, they show a different distribution pattern. L 2 tends to distribute the values for all the intervals (thus reducing the number of points in the first one [0.0%, 0.1%]), whereas L ∞ permits a significant number of values with medium percentage deviations (since it only focuses in the largest one). On the other hand, if we look at the largest intervals, L 2 provides in most cases the lowest number of points greater than, e.g., 2.0%.
Finally, the lowest two-norms of the deviations vector are provided in all the instances by the L 2 objective. This is a consequence of L 2 being the only quadratic objective of the three tested. Except for instance hier13, L ∞ always provides deviations with better two-norms than L 1 .
From the above comments, we can conclude that the L 1 objective provides the best results when a first-order comparison measure, as the mean percentage deviation, is considered. However, when a second-order measure is used, as the two-norm of the deviations or the standard deviation of the percentage deviations, L 2 seems to be the best choice. The above is an immediate result of the objective functions (linear or quadratic) of the respective optimization problems. As for the distribution of absolute and percentage deviations, L 1 provides more cells in the lowest interval, but also with more medium-large deviations than L 2 ; the latter distributes more uniformly the deviations among all the cells. Computationally, the fastest option is the L 2 objective. L ∞ provides acceptable results for both the first-order and second-order comparison measures. However, it is computationally expensive, which makes it a less convenient choice for large volumes of data. The distances can be combined into a single objective function to meet the end-user requirements (e.g., L 1 for internal and L 2 -possibly with a penalty parameter-for marginal cells).
Solving the CSPLIB instances
For this group of experiments we omitted the seven complex instances of last Subsection, and those involving a small number of cells. Table 10 shows the features of the instances considered. Columns "Name", "n", "|P|" and "m" have the same meaning that in Table 2 . Column "N.coef" gives the number of coefficients of the constraints matrix M. Table 11 shows the results obtained with L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ . For each distance, the execution time (columns "CPU"), average percentage deviation for all the cells (columns "%Dev."), and two-norm of the deviations vector (columns "2-norm") are provided. The results reported for L ∞ were computed by the simplex method: as stated in Subsection 8.1, the interior-point solutions, although with the same objective function, provided worst average percentage deviations and distances for all the instances. The results for L 1 with the simplex and interior-point method were similar, although the simplex was the most efficient choice in most cases. Those are the results reported in the Table, but for the four instances which are clearly marked. In three of these four cases, the simplex method provided a wrong solution. Tuning CPLEX 8.0 we were able to solve them. The interior-point method could solve all the instances with the default settings.
Most of the conclusions drawn in Subsection 8.1 also apply here: L 1 and L 2 provide the best results for, respectively, first and second order measures, and L ∞ the slowest executions. The end-user can choose the most appropriate distance for its particular data. Suitable choices are L 1 if a number of cells with small percentage deviations is required, or L 2 if the goal is to reduce the two-norm between the original and perturbed values. Figure 4 shows the effect of both distances on a very small one-dimensional table. The table considered is a 1 + a 2 = a 3 , with a 1 = 12 and a 2 = 8. We imposed z 1 + z 2 = z 3 and z 3 ≥ 4, i.e., an upper protection level of 4 is forced for the marginal sensitive cell. Using w i = 1/a i the optimal solution obtained with L 1 is z 1 = 4, z 2 = 0 and z 3 = 4. With the same weights, the optimal solution provided by L 2 is z 1 = 2.4, z 2 = 1.6 and z 3 = 4. If integer values were required, the z 1 and z 2 values could be rounded through some heuristic postprocess (in that case the most reasonable choice would be z 1 = 2 and z 2 = 2). Both distances can be combined in the single objective ω(
being a weight for the linear and quadratic terms. For ω = 1 and ω = 0 the combined objective corresponds to the L 1 and L 2 distances, respectively. Figure 4 shows the perturbed internal cell values obtained for ω = 0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1, and the original ones (a 1 , a 2 ). Clearly, the L 2 point is closer to (12, 8) , but the L 1 solution preserves the value of cell a 2 . This is consistent with the results observed for the CSPLIB instances.
Conclusions
The minimum-distance controlled perturbation framework introduced in that work proved to be a promising tool for tabular data protection. We examined three particular methods, using the L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ distances. The L 1 variant was independently suggested, using an alternative derivation, by Dandekar and Cox (2002) . The minimum-distance approach has shown to be efficient: can solve real-world large problems in few seconds; versatile: deals with any table or set of tables, and with any additional linear constraint (e.g., preserving the value of marginal cells); and safe: even with partial information, an attacker is not able to reproduce the original data. Alternative approaches for tabular data protection have flaws in some of the above features.
The three methods tested, for L 1 , L 2 and L ∞ , provided different patterns of deviations, each of them with a clear behaviour. National Statistical Agencies would choose the best suited method for their data. It is also possible to combine them, mainly L 1 and L 2 , to fit particular needs.
Some related fields of research can be explored. One of them is to deal with frequency tables. Except for particular situations, as, e.g., two-dimensional tables and the L 1 distance, the deviations computed can have fractional values, and thus not being valid for an integer table. There are two ways to obtain integer deviations. The most efficient one is to produce them from the fractional solution computed by the methods presented in this work. A heuristic post-process should be used for this purpose. The second possibility is to solve an integer programming problem (e.g., forcing integer deviations in the optimization problems of this work). In general, for large tables, that can result in impractical execution times.
A second field of research deals with the optimization solvers. In a static environment, the final goal might be the protection, in a single run, of all the tables derived from the same microdata. The resulting problem is huge. In a dynamic environment, the goal would be the online protection of particular tables (e.g., obtained from end-user queries from a data-warehouse). Speed is instrumental in that case. In both situations, we may need highly-efficient implementations of the optimization methods used in this work, which exploit the problem structure. Some work has already been done in this direction for large (i.e., one million cells) three-dimensional tables and L 2 (Castro 2000 (Castro , 2003 , where a specialized implementation was two orders of magnitude faster than the CPLEX 8.0 solver.
